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A common accusation against Law and Economics is that it is based 
on unrealistic and unreasonable assumptions, such as claiming that 
people behave rationally.  This accusation may very well be true.  But it 
should not stand in the way of progress in legal analysis.  The reason is 
that when something is assumed about facts—for example, how people 
behave or, alternatively, about the best way to interpret a set of 
judgments—the test of this assumption is in whether the hypotheses built 
on it are supported or refuted by other facts.  If an assumption does not 
lead to accurate predictions, it can easily be discarded.  In contrast, 
conceptual analysis of law that tries to assess the nature of a legal norm 
or field, for example establishing whether investment treaty arbitration is 
a part of public international law or not, is not assuming anything about 
facts.  Because the only substance that is played with is concepts, no facts 
can be brought to refute the argument, only competing narratives.  The 
purpose of this Article is to explain why the process of making assumptions 
is necessary for legal scholarship and why it is impossible to understand 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
As often happens, the law on a certain point is ambiguous and could 
be interpreted in several different ways.  A Law and Economics scholar 
suggests interpreting the law in a way that leads to an efficient result.1  
“Why do you assume the law is efficient?” is the automatic reaction of 
her Critical Legal Studies (CLS) adversary.  “That is a legitimate 
question,” she should say.  I assume the law is efficient because by 
explaining the law as if it leads to efficiency, I can make better sense of 
more doctrines and make good predictions about how judges will decide 
cases.  Do you want to assume something else?  What is your hypothesis? 
This Article is not committed to the assumptions of Law and 
Economics (the field assumes a lot of different things anyway).  The 
assumption that law leads to efficient solutions may be the wrong 
assumption, because better predictions may just as well be forthcoming 
under the assumption that the law is committed to some deontological 
moral principles or anything else for that matter.  This Article is only 
committed to the necessity of making assumptions in legal scholarship.  
The gist of the argument is that only by making assumptions—thinking 
about the law as if it is designed to do something, even if there is no 
evidence anyone ever intended it to do so—can progress be made in the 
 
 1 See Owen M. Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1986) 
(referring to the “as if” type of argument used by Law and Economics scholars as a 
hypothesis and says that it should be supported by evidence of a dynamic that makes 
the hypothesis credible.  But the “as if” assessment is not a hypothesis but an 
assumption.  A hypothesis uses this assumption and is checked against reality to see if 
the hypothesis is correct or not, not whether the assumption is correct).  
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analysis of the law.  This Article does not attempt to find the perfect 
assumptions to make sense of any legal regime, but it insists that making 
assumptions is necessary.  
Part II starts by reviewing some assumptions that are regularly 
made in legal scholarship.  It then explains the fallacy ingrained in trying 
to decipher the concepts that stand behind the law.  The Article then 
makes three arguments for the inevitability of making assumptions. 
First, openly making assumptions is the only way out of the 
intellectual trap of trying to find the essence of the law.  Those who 
argue that the law has an essence are looking for conceptions that do 
not just help to make sense of the law: they are supposed to constitute 
the very being of the law.  This is a fallacy that has normative 
implications because once a conception of the law is identified, legal 
solutions stem out of it without any concern for policy considerations.  
Part III explains why conceptual thinking in law is wrong, and why this 
means assumptions are necessary.  
Second, making assumptions and openly declaring what they are is 
the only way to sustain scientific inquiry as a collaborative enterprise.  
Everyone has biases that affect their way of thinking and their view of 
the world.  It is tempting to combat these biases by trying to reveal them 
and to present a relativistic account that is relevant only to people with 
the same set of biases.  But the result of this exercise is to turn science 
into a cacophony of competing narratives without any prospect of 
gradually improving the accumulated knowledge within the field.  The 
only way to make research useful for other people with different biases 
is by clearly stipulating what assumptions are made, what hypotheses 
are to be examined, and what conditions would falsify them.  Part IV 
argues that making assumptions is required to make legal scholarship 
thrive as a field of research.  
Third, making assumptions in legal research is an exercise in 
humility that is essential to any form of liberal rule.  The liberal 
acknowledges that she does not know what the best legal solution is for 
everyone, all things considered.  To guide policy, a liberal must assume 
some form of connection between the choices people make and what is 
good for them.  Governments should assume people are rational, or at 
least boundedly rational, even if this assumption does not always hold 
true because such an assumption implies respect for people’s choices.  A 
regime that does away with assumptions aspires to know all the best 
solutions for all its citizens all the time.  Such a utopian worldview is 
bound to deteriorate into tyranny.  Part V suggests that lawyers who do 
not make assumptions can actually be dangerous to any form of 
liberalism.  
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The conclusion from this analysis is that nothing that can be said 
about the law is true forever and in every case.  There are legal 
principles such as efficiency, consistency, and proportionality which 
explain many legal doctrines and can therefore serve as good 
assumptions to make sense of the law.  To say the same thing differently, 
these principles are assumptions that can lead to the adoption of 
hypotheses that make good predictions about the content of legal 
doctrines.  But in some unique situations, hypotheses that are based on 
these assumptions do not lead to good predictions—they do not make 
sense of certain doctrines.  In these situations, the assumptions should 
simply be discarded for better ones; better not because they are truer 
but because hypotheses based on them lead to good predictions.  
II.  LEGAL ASSUMPTIONS 
A.  The Proper Thinking About Doctrine  
In an essay about the methodology of economics, Milton Friedman 
develops a theoretical framework to demonstrate why assumptions 
should not be judged by how realistic they are.  He gives a powerful 
example: imagine that you are trying to predict how much time it takes 
for a free-falling body thrown from a building to reach the ground.  If 
you are throwing a metal ball, the assumption of no air resistance can 
lead to a good prediction.  If you are throwing a feather, assuming no air 
resistance would lead to a plainly wrong prediction.2  
In both cases, the hypothesis is the same: that a free-falling body 
covers a distance given by the formula 1/2gt2 where g is approximately 
9.81 meters per squared second.  The assumption is also exactly the 
same: no air resistance.  And yet in one setting the assumption leads to 
good results, while in another setting it leads to false ones.3  The moral 
of this demonstration is that assumptions should not strive to be 
realistic.  
In fact, Friedman goes as far as saying that good assumptions are 
always untrue because the purpose of the assumption is to build a 
hypothesis that explains the most phenomena by the least factual detail.  
Irrelevant circumstances should not factor into the calculation, and 
assumptions about them can therefore be deliberately false,4 just like 
assuming no air resistance when throwing a metal ball. 
 
 2 Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
ECONOMICS: AN ANTHOLOGY 145, 154 (Daniel M. Hausman ed., 3rd ed. 2007). 
 3 Id.  
 4 Id. at 153.  
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What is the connection between Friedman’s theory on the 
methodology of economics and the law?  Oliver Wendell Holmes’s 
famous essay The Path of the Law actually describes the law in a way 
that is rather similar to Friedman’s view of economics.  According to 
Holmes, the law is only a set of predictions about what courts will do in 
fact—for example, what penalty they will impose in a criminal case.  
Many of the details in any legal case do not affect that prediction and can 
therefore be safely ignored.  Holmes gives the example of the color of 
the hat worn by a party to a contract.  The color of the hat is not a legally 
relevant fact and it can be omitted completely from legal texts.5  
While the color of hats is simply not mentioned by lawyers, there 
are situations in which lawyers need to make an assumption that is 
factually false but can lead to good predictions of what judges will do in 
fact.  One example is the doctrine of the reasonable person as applied in 
the so-called Hand Formula.  The Hand Formula determines that a 
person has been negligent if she did not take a precaution that costs less 
than the damage she could have averted multiplied by the probability of 
its occurrence.6  The law assumes that reasonable persons take more 
care in such cases even if almost everyone in that situation would have 
done the same thing.  This assumption can lead to finding people 
negligent even if they did not behave any different than the social norm.7  
The specific assumption here is that a reasonable person would be 
more careful, even though most real people would behave the same.  But 
the larger and more interesting assumption in this situation is that the 
law as a whole complies with the dictates of efficiency.  Efficiency 
determines the standard of care required, not the actual behavior of 
people in society.  If you know what the efficient result is, you know how 
a judge would decide the case.  
Another assumption made by lawyers is that the law is consistent.  
A legal doctrine is considered better by the mere fact that it promotes 
the predictability of the law.  To serve that end, the doctrine itself has to 
be predictable.  It has to match as much as possible the other relevant 
rules and judgments.  The only problem is that sometimes legal 
doctrines do not fit together as neatly as this assumption seems to 
suggest.  Consistency is a useful assumption most of the time because it 
can lead to good predictions of how judges usually behave.  When better 
 
 5 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 458 
(1897). 
 6 See Ariel Porat, Misalignments in Tort Law, 121 YALE L.J. 82, 84 (2011).  
 7 See Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 NYU L. REV. 323, 326 
(2012) (contrasting this normative definition of the reasonable person with a positive 
definition that looks at what most people would actually do in that situation).  
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predictions of judicial behavior can be made under the assumption of 
inconsistency, the assumption of consistency must simply be discarded. 
The same goes for proportionality.  Legal responses across many 
legal fields comply with the principle of proportionality.8  If you want to 
settle an ambiguity in the laws of war, criminal law, or international 
sales law, assuming that the law is committed to proportionality would 
usually lead to good predictions of what judges will do.  Proportionality 
can therefore usually serve as a good guide for scholars.  But there are 
situations in which proportionality would not lead to good incentives, 
and legal doctrine has adapted to these situations by systematically 
digressing from proportionality in these cases.9  Sometimes 
proportionality is not a good assumption because it does not lead to 
good predictions.  
All these assumptions may seem like a useful way to predict what 
judges will do when faced with legal ambiguity.  But H.L.A. Hart raised 
an important objection to Holmes’s view of judging as predicting the 
actions of judges.  Hart argued that judging cannot be based only on 
prediction because then it would force judges who are considering their 
own course of action in a case before them to base it on the prediction 
of what they would do themselves.10  
The solution to this false paradox may not be that difficult.  It was 
presented most clearly by the founder of Scandinavian Legal Realism, 
Alf Ross.  Ross explained that the task of the legal scholar making sense 
of the law is not to put herself in the shoes of the judge.11  The scholar 
does not share the normative commitments of the judge, but she is able 
to describe the judge’s normative commitments.  The scholar is able to 
build hypotheses about the judge’s normative commitments and test 
her predictions using the judge’s actual behavior.12 
 
 8 See  Thomas M. Franck, On Proportionality of Countermeasures in International 
Law, 102 AMER. J. INT’L L. 715, 715–16 (2008). 
 9 See generally Shai Dothan, When Immediate Responses Fail, 51 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. 1075 (2018) (demonstrating how the laws of war, criminal law, and international 
sales law can usually be explained based on the assumption of commitment to 
proportional responses.  But in cases of acute uncertainty, legal doctrines cannot be 
explained well based on the proportionality assumption, and a pattern of delayed and 
disproportional responses is mandated by the law.  Insights from experimental game 
theory explain this shift.). 
 10 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 102 (1961); Stephen R. Perry, Holmes versus 
Hart: The Bad Man in Legal Theory, in THE PATH OF THE LAW AND ITS INFLUENCE: THE LEGACY 
OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 158, 188 (Steven J. Burton ed., 2000). 
 11 See Jakob v. H. Holtermann, A Straw Man Revisited: Resettling the Score between 
H.L.A. Hart and Scandinavian Legal Realism, 57 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 17–18 (2017) 
 12 See id. at 19 (explaining that though it is impossible to know what judges actually 
believe, it is possible to construct hypotheses about the convictions of judges and test 
them against the judges’ actual behavior); ALF ROSS, ON LAW AND JUSTICE 89 (2019).  
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Like any theory based on hypotheses, scholars need to make 
assumptions, and just like Friedman articulated clearly regarding 
economics, these assumptions may just as well be false yet lead to true 
predictions.  For example, a legal scholar may argue that the main 
purpose of criminal law is to deter criminals.  She can hypothesize that 
judges will assign penalties that comply with the Becker model, which 
stipulates that criminals will be deterred if the penalty they are expected 
to receive if caught, multiplied by the probability of getting caught, is 
higher than the benefit they derive from committing the crime.13  The 
scholar assumes that judges assume people are making rational cost-
benefit calculations.  It may be untrue that people are rational, and it 
may also be untrue that judges use cost-benefit calculations when they 
assign penalties; still, the Becker model may serve as the best predictor 
of the magnitude of penalties.  If using the rationality assumption 
succeeds in predicting the magnitude of penalties, it is useful, and the 
scholar can employ it.  If it does not, it should be abandoned regardless 
of what either potential criminals or judges are actually thinking.  
B.  The Error in Thinking About Law Through Concepts  
While this may sound obvious to some readers, the matter is 
confusing to many lawyers.  Some lawyers devote considerable 
intellectual energy to trying to distill concepts that they believe lie at the 
core of the law.  
For example, a book-length study argues based on a series of 
analogies and comparisons that investment treaty arbitration is a part 
of public law.14  This argument is not susceptible to pragmatic analysis.  
It is not trying to predict anything concrete about human behavior, but 
rather to describe some mythical essence that is not conducive to 
scientific exploration.  
This does not mean that applying public law doctrines to 
investment treaty arbitration would lead to bad results.  In fact, another 
monograph makes the case that applying principles of public law to 
regulate investment treaty arbitration may lead to good outcomes.  But 
this is an argument made based on functional reasons: arbitrators’ 
interests bias them in favor of business and create a need for 
counterbalance in the form of public law principles.15  There is an 
 
 13 See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 
169, 181–82 (1968); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of 
Public Enforcement of Law, 38 J. ECON. LIT. 45, 47–48 (2000).   
 14 See  generally ERIC DE BRABANDERE, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AS PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2014).  
 15 GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 152–53 (2007). 
DOTHAN (DO NOT DELETE) 12/23/2020  9:33 PM 
652 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:645 
argument that can be tested empirically.  Maybe it is true and maybe it 
is false, but it is susceptible to scientific inquiry. 
Searching for concepts that are supposed to represent the essence 
of legal doctrine is wrong because it makes statements that cannot be 
established scientifically.  The philosopher of science Alfred Jules Ayer 
argued in his famous book Language, Truth and Logic that the only 
statements that can be verified are either empirical hypotheses or 
logical tautologies.16  Such propositions can be either true or false, and 
the scientific method may determine if they are true with different levels 
of certainty.17  In contrast, metaphysical statements—statements about 
the essence of things—are simply nonsense, at least from the 
perspective of science, since their truth value cannot be established.18  
While Ayer’s argument has been refuted on logical grounds as far as 
individual statements are concerned, it is useful for explaining entire 
scientific theories.19 
Legal scholarship complies with the need to reject metaphysical 
statements.  In fact, Felix Cohen also uses the word nonsense to describe 
the use of legal concepts to make claims that cannot be contested on 
either ethical or empirical grounds. 20  Law as a self-referential system 
of concepts is nonsense because it does not say anything that can be 
proven true or false.21  
 
 16 ALFRED JULES AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LOGIC 41 (1952).  
 17 Id. at 35.  
 18 Id. at 43. 
 19 Ayer and other followers of logical empiricism generally claimed that all 
meaningful statements have to be verifiable, but that claim was exposed to significant 
criticism.  In response to this criticism, Rudolf Carnap was willing to withdraw to the 
narrower claim that it is only scientific statements that need to verifiable.  By their 
nature, scientific statements are subject to disputes in the scientific community.  The 
only way to settle such a dispute is by using logic and empirical evidence.  See Logical 
Empiricism in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 4.1 (Edward N. Zalta ed., Fall 2017).  
For a very detailed and technical analysis of the failure of logical empiricism on 
analytical examination see 1 SCOTT SOAMES, PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS IN THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY: THE DAWN OF ANALYSIS 274–99 (2003).  To salvage some of logical empiricism’s 
insights regarding whole theories, Carl Hempel explained that theoretical claims are 
meaningful when they combine a set of observational statements and hypotheses that 
can be used to make testable predictions.  Empirical content is not to be assessed in each 
individual statement but in the system as a whole, which is geared for empirical 
prediction.  Similarly, Willard Van Orman Quine explained that meaning requires 
verification based on observational consequences, but these cannot be reduced to 
sentences and must be derived from entire theories.  See id. at 296–97.  Quine’s 
explanation why sentences do not have individual meaning, only theories, is that the 
connection between every sentence and the evidence itself is mediated through other 
sentences in the theory.  See id. at 383–84.  
 20 Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. 
L. REV. 809, 820 (1935). 
 21 Id. at 821.  
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Cohen argues for understanding law based on the functional 
approach—law is a prediction of what courts will do.22  When law is 
understood in this way, scholars can easily state that the law is such and 
such as an empirical matter because this is what judges actually do.  
They can proceed to criticize this judicial tendency on ethical grounds 
without falling into any logical contradiction.23 
Even Cohen, writing in 1935, was not saying something completely 
original.  At the beginning of his famous essay, he refers to the work of 
Von Jhering, who some fifty years earlier criticized the use of concepts 
in legal scholarship.24  What Jhering expressed in German, Ross 
expressed in Danish, and Holmes and Cohen expressed in English is a 
true cross-cultural resistance to a particular kind of legal fiction—legal 
concepts that cannot be subjected to empirical inquiry.  
Assumptions are also a form of fiction: they refer to things that do 
not exist, and the scholar should not even care about their truth value.  
But when you combine an assumption with a hypothesis and test this 
hypothesis against facts, you can verify if the hypothesis is true or false.  
This is why assumptions are necessary in every field of science.25  
Although easily confused, assumptions do not share the ills of 
conceptual thinking.  The rest of this Article is dedicated to the argument 
that making assumptions in legal scholarship is the only cure to the 
relentless malaise of conceptual thinking.  
III.  THE ARGUMENT AGAINST ESSENTIALISM 
In 1921, the Jewish philosopher Franz Rosenzweig wrote a short 
book called The Little Book of Healthy and Sick Human Understanding to 
make his complicated philosophical views more accessible.  In this book, 
Rosenzweig decries the practice of philosophizing about the essence of 
things instead of using common sense to act in the real world.26  
Rosenzweig was not alone in perceiving the importance of focusing on 
 
 22 Id. at 839.  
 23 See id. at 839–42.  
 24 Rudolf von Jhering, In the Heaven of Legal Concepts: A Fantasy, 58 TEMP. L.Q. 799, 
802 (1985).  Jhering mocked the use of legal concepts with a humorous text describing 
a Roman law scholar who dies and goes to the heaven of legal concepts.  In this heaven, 
legal concepts exist in their pure form so that every legal question can be solved simply 
by analyzing the concepts and without any need for factual observation and practical 
considerations.  The text was originally published in German in 1884. 
 25 For an enormously comprehensive exploration of the use of assumptions in 
numerous fields of science, see H. VAIHINGER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF ‘AS IF’: A SYSTEM OF THE 
THEORETICAL, PRACTICAL AND RELIGIOUS FICTIONS OF MANKIND (C.K. Ogden trans., 2009) 
(1924).  
 26 FRANZ ROSENZWEIG, DAS BÜCHLEIN VOM GESUNDEN UND KRANKEN MENCHENVERSTAND 
(1964).  
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the impact things have instead of on their essence.  Writing in 1907, 
William James launched a whole field of philosophy known as 
Pragmatism.  In a book that carries the same name, he explains that the 
focus of philosophy should not be on the essence of concepts but on their 
actual consequences, which he called their “cash-value.”27  What is true 
for philosophy is true for legal scholarship.  This Part will demonstrate 
what healthy and pragmatic legal thinking should look like.  
A.  Healthy Legal Thinking 
A simple example of healthy legal thinking appears in Karl 
Llewellyn’s classic guide to law students, The Bramble Bush.28  Students 
are instructed to extract the rules on offer and acceptance sufficient to 
form a contract from actual cases.  In one case, a person has made an 
offer and manages to deliver a revocation before his offer is accepted.  
The court ruled that in this case the meeting of minds necessary for a 
contract to materialize did not take place.  In another case, a person 
makes an offer, and a letter of acceptance is sent to him before his 
revocation is received.  The court decided that a contract was formed.29  
The two cases may appear contradictory, but it is easy to extract a 
general doctrine that agrees with both of them: even if the two sides are 
not simultaneously interested in the contract, the contract would stand 
if the person receiving the offer reasonably believes that the offer still 
stands when she accepts it.30 
This legal reasoning is healthy because it is based on trying to make 
sense of the institution of contracts in the most effective way.  To do that, 
the reasoning is based on assumptions and hypotheses, even if 
extracting them is not always easy.  In the second case mentioned above, 
an assumption is made that a person stands by his offer until his letter 
of revocation is received, even if that happens not to be true.  The reason 
is that based on this assumption, one can hypothesize that a contract is 
formed in such cases, which would explain in the best possible way 
judges’ rulings in contract cases.  
Llewellyn explained that the doctrinal rule should be pushed up to 
the point when it does not make sense anymore.  If the person who 
accepted the offer reasonably believed no revocation was sent, but his 
clerk already received the revocation letter, maybe the rule should be 
 
 27 WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM: A NEW NAME FOR SOME OLD WAYS OF THINKING (1st ed. 
1907).  
 28 K. N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY (1951).   
 29 Id. at 49–50. 
 30 Id. 
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different.31  Maybe a person should be assumed to know everything her 
clerk knows at the time when she attempts to accept an offer.  The only 
question is what assumption would help to construct a hypothesis about 
the existence or nonexistence of the contract that would make sense of 
the most judgments. 
In cases of doubt, one can turn to a higher level of assumptions, 
such as the assumption that the law strives for efficiency, to determine 
what should be assumed about the will of the parties.  If the law is 
assumed to be efficient, maybe people should be assumed to stand by 
their offers until they formally deliver a revocation letter.  The reason is 
that people making such offers are the ones that can most easily make 
sure their revocation letters are received in time.  They are the so-called 
least-cost avoider.32  The same line of reasoning may just as well dictate 
that people should be assumed to know all that is known to their clerks.  
Healthy legal thinking complies with the Latin phrase natura non 
facit saltus: it makes no leaps but rather evolves steadily, always keeping 
in sight the logic of the precedents it chooses to follow.  Legal thinking 
uses precedents because if cases involve similar policy considerations, 
a judge deciding the later case can rely on the prior judgment to make a 
satisfactory policy decision.33  By making a decision with the same policy 
outcomes as past judgments, a judge or a scholar can follow the 
normative commitments of the community of judges.  The key is not that 
the cases are similar in some abstract sense but that their similarity is 
relevant to their policy choices. 
If the name of the person making the offer in the first Llewellyn 
scenario is Olixander, and that is exactly the name of the person making 
the offer in the second scenario, this bizarre coincidence has absolutely 
no legal significance.  Neither would the fact that both individuals are 
avid water polo fans, or the fact that both have a parrot called Bobbie.  
Legal analysis that proceeds through assumptions and hypotheses 
abstracts away all the irrelevant information, leaving only factors with 
concrete policy implications.  The examples just mentioned are clearly 
 
 31 Id. at 50.  
 32 See  Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1095–97 (1972) 
(explaining that the need to search for the least-cost avoider arises because the 
assumption of no transaction costs often must be discarded and replaced by 
assumptions that admit of certain transaction costs to predict the actual efficiency of 
human interaction.  Under the assumption of no transaction costs, the market will 
always revert to the efficient solution.); Eric Rasmusen, Agency Law and Contract 
Formation, 6 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 369, 406 (2004) (applying the least cost avoidance 
reasoning, which is regularly used in tort law, to solve agency problems in contract law).   
 33 See Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 600 (1987). 
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absurd—no one would make the mistake of taking these irrelevant 
peculiarities into account.  But serious scholars make the mistake of 
taking things into account that are just as irrelevant because they think 
they reveal the “essence” of the law.  
B.  What Is Wrong with Conceptual Legal Thinking 
The opposite of healthy legal thinking is conceptual legal thinking.  
Conceptual analysis involves copying legal choices from one legal 
setting to another solely because of some abstract similarity between 
the two settings, and without taking into account the purpose of the 
copied legal choice.  This way of reasoning is an invalid form of 
“reasoning by analogy” because it applies legal concepts in a way that is 
autonomous of their policy goals.  
Reasoning by analogy that ignores policy considerations is 
intellectually flawed because the similarity between two legal cases is 
relevant only when it implies that the past case and the judgment 
advocated for have similar policy outcomes.34  If scholars seek to predict 
judges’ behavior through analogies, they should usually explain the 
policy considerations that justify the analogy.  Alternatively, they can 
admit that only similarities affecting policy outcomes are relevant but 
claim convincingly that they can identify such similarities without 
observing directly the policy outcomes involved.  Some scholars 
relegate the task of defining what similarities are relevant to the realm 
of legal expertise and intuition,35 and others refer to elaborate 
techniques that can make this determination even without considering 
policy considerations directly.36  
If a scholar instead tries to distill some concept that can carry over 
from one case to the other, she misunderstands the nature of legal 
analysis.  Such concepts are fictions, but—unlike assumptions—they are 
not useful fictions that can lead to accurate hypotheses or be discarded.  
 
 34 See Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 756–57 
(1993); Richard A. Posner, Reasoning by Analogy, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 761, 765 (2006).  
 35 See LLOYD L. WEINREB, LEGAL REASON: THE USE OF ANALOGY IN LEGAL ARGUMENT 59–60 
(2nd ed. 2016). 
 36 See Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational 
Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 923, 948–49, 962–63 (1996) 
(suggesting that it is possible to extract from specific doctrines a general rule that 
reflects the commitments of judges through an analytical technique known as abduction.  
Abduction can never prove conclusively that the rule reflects the commitments of 
judges, but it can serve as an educated guess.); Sunstein, supra note 34, at 751–54 
(describing a technique known as reflective equilibrium that allows scholars to compare 
general rules and specific doctrines that they think reflect the commitments of judges.  
By modifying both types of sources simultaneously to better match each other, the 
process gets the scholar closer to understanding the commitments of judges.).  
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Because the concept is not systematically checked against the actual 
behavior of judges, it can easily lead to arbitrary results.  
As an example, consider a recent paper arguing that English tort 
law is committed to serving the function of vindication—affirming 
certain protected interests.37  According to this paper, a concept can be 
distilled from the law and can lead to normative implications, such as 
recommending damages regardless of proving harm, at least if there are 
no countervailing policy considerations.38 
It is perfectly possible that English tort law is explained well as if it 
follows the function of vindication.  In that case, the judges’ 
commitments can be predicted based on the assumption that vindication 
is their goal.  If, based on this assumption, a hypothesis that damages are 
granted without proving harm is made and it is confirmed by observing 
judicial behavior, the assumption can be kept.  But if such a hypothesis 
is refuted by observing real judgments, then the assumption should 
simply be rejected. 
Scholars have zero commitment to the truth value of their 
assumptions.  If the assumption does not lead to hypotheses that predict 
the normative commitments of judges, as evidenced by their actual 
behavior, it will be discarded.  In contrast, thinking about the law 
through concepts implies a commitment to a certain view of the law, 
even if scholars sometimes qualify this commitment by indicating that 
the law has multiple functions and is different in some areas compared 
to others.39 
Some supporters of conceptual legal thinking argue that it helps to 
organize the way scholars think about the law, as a form of “legal 
metaphysics.”40  If concepts are employed only for their aesthetic 
qualities, this way of thinking may not cause any harm.  But it certainly 
would not do any good either.  Indeed, the vibrant debate in philosophy 
on whether certain universal characteristics constitute the essence of 
law has no normative implications.41  If a theorist presupposes that 
every legal system has certain properties, by her logic any social 
 
 37 See Jason N. E. Varuhas, The Concept of ‘Vindication’ in the Law of Torts: Rights 
Interests and Damages, 34 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 253, 256 (2014). 
 38 See id. at 256.   
 39 See id. at 260, 292–93 (arguing that some areas of the law serve the function of 
vindication less than others); id. at 275 (stating that certain areas of the law apply 
specific legal solutions that are different from the main doctrine).  
 40 See generally Kenneth Einar Himma, Conceptual Jurisprudence: An Introduction to 
Conceptual Analysis and Methodology in Legal Theory, 26 REVUS 65, 83, 91 (2015).  
 41 See generally Brian Z. Tamanaha, Necessary and Universal Truths About Law?, 30 
RATIO JURIS 3 (2017) (reviewing and criticizing the scholarship that argues there are 
certain things that constitute the essence of the law).  
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institution that does not have these properties would be nonlegal.42  In 
contrast, when concepts are later used to make normative 
recommendations, as is done in invalid forms of reasoning by analogy, 
such use causes real damage to legal analysis. 
Some scholars choose a different path: they clearly disavow any 
claim to describe the law and instead promote a project that is focused 
only on the question of what legal doctrines can be justified based on 
some coherent set of principles.43  For them, a legal doctrine, even an 
established one, that does not comply with the required level of 
coherence is simply a legal mistake.44  By preventing any possibility of 
refutation by doctrines that exist in the real world, this system of 
reasoning may conveniently achieve logical consistency.  But at the 
same time, by committing to coherence at all costs, it forfeits both its 
ability to describe the normative commitments of real judges45 and the 
possibility of defending policy choices based on any other grounds 
besides its own autonomous set of principles.46  These are unacceptable 
concessions that have been rightly criticized throughout the modern 
era.   
More than a century ago, Roscoe Pound criticized conceptual 
thinking in law, calling it by the derogatory name “mechanical 
jurisprudence.”47  Pound explained that creating concepts and using 
them to recommend normative solutions without accounting for their 
social implications is unjustified.48  Similarly, a scholar who extracts 
concepts from judicial behavior and uses them to explain the normative 
commitments of judges in other areas without actually checking those 
judges’ behavior is making unwarranted choices.  
Conceptual legal analysis is like a sea monster that grows two new 
heads every time it is beheaded.  It seems like the only way to avoid 
unhealthy conceptual thinking and to slay the sea monster is to offer a 
methodologically sound substitute for legal concepts.  This substitute is 
a methodology that admits it works through assumptions that may be 
 
 42 See id. at 20; Joseph Raz, Can There Be a Theory of Law, in BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 324, at \1 (Martin P. Golding & William A. 
Edmundson eds. 2005).   
 43 ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW XIX (2012).  
 44 Id. at 13.  
 45 Id. at 31–32 (A system that completely defies coherence would be unintelligible 
on this account) See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Pragmatic Conceptualism, 6 LEG. THEO. 457, 
468–69 (2000) (describing the first concession)  
 46 WEINRIB, supra note 43 at 17–18, 55; See Zipursky, supra note 45 at 469 
(describing the second concession)  
 47 Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908).  
 48 See id. at 612. 
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untrue or inaccurate.  By working through assumptions, scholars can 
avoid the confusion associated with commitment to concepts that 
supposedly reflect some essence of the law; scholars can choose instead 
to adopt assumptions only if they can lead to hypotheses that are 
confirmed by real judicial behavior.  
If it is assumed that a person making an offer stands by it until her 
letter of revocation is received, this assumption does not stem from the 
concept or the “essence” of contract.  The assumption is useful to form a 
hypothesis that judges would recognize a contract in these conditions.  
When conditions change, this hypothesis may be refuted—it will not 
represent judges’ decisions.  The scholar may have to adopt a different 
assumption; for example, that a revocation letter should be considered 
received when it is accepted by the clerk of the person receiving the 
offer.  Assumptions are responsive to facts and can always be checked 
against them.  
IV.  THE ARGUMENT FOR SYSTEMIC ACCURACY  
A.  Theoretical Background  
The CLS movement disputes the existence of two qualities that are 
often used to justify the law: formalism and objectivism.  Formalism 
means the existence of legal doctrine that is distinct from ideological 
positions.49  Objectivism is the view that legal analysis can proceed 
based on neutral constraints on human organization that are detached 
from the power struggles in society.50  
CLS criticizes fields of legal scholarship that adhere, directly or 
indirectly, to the idea that law can be studied objectively.  For example, 
CLS scholars criticize the Law and Economics movement because it tries 
to appear formalist and objective while adhering to a specific form of 
economic theory that is grounded in a particular history and serves 
certain interests.51 
The gist of this Part is to explain why, even if scholars applying Law 
and Economics, or any other field of legal scholarship, are indeed biased, 
this poses no problem for the objectivity of legal science within these 
fields.  The solution to scholars’ biases is not to try to debias themselves 
by exposing their hidden ideological leanings, as CLS suggests.52  The 
 
 49 See Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. 
REV. 561, 564 (1983). 
 50 Id. at 565.  
 51 Id. at 574–75.  
 52 Id. at 578–80.  See Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal 
Studies Have What Minorities Want?, 22 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 301, 308–09 (1987) 
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solution is rather to sustain a scientific practice that allows for 
systematic testing of the ideas ingrained in legal scholarship.  
The notion that objectivity in science cannot and should not stem 
from the scientists’ individual efforts to debias themselves underlies 
Karl Popper’s philosophy of science.  Popper explained that a scientist 
can never be sure of the objectivity of her discovery.  Inner conviction in 
the truthfulness of results is scientifically meaningless.  The only 
scientific objectivity that should be aspired to is making statements that 
can be intersubjectively tested.  This means that a scientist needs to 
assure that every experiment that leads to a scientific discovery can be 
reproduced.53 
Legal science does not proceed based on experiments in the 
physical world, but it should be constrained by the same commitment 
to intersubjective testability.  A statement about the law should be 
testable by anyone regardless of their gender, race, or social class.  
Because every scholar brings with her a package of ideological 
inclinations that cannot be fully debiased, the key to allowing testability 
of her ideas is in the methodology that she uses.  Any attempt to get rid 
of individual biases will produce statements that are not truly objective 
and that cannot be systematically checked by other scholars.  
In contrast, the scientific practice of making assumptions and being 
frank about them is the only way to ensure the testability of statements 
about the law.  Once the assumptions are in place, every scholar can 
check whether the proposed hypotheses about the law are indeed 
confirmed by the facts.  For example, if the assumption is that criminals 
behave rationally, every scholar can check if real criminal punishments 
concur with the Becker model.54  If they do not, the assumption can be 
simply replaced by a more fitting one.  
B.  International Law as a Case Study 
Legal doctrine is often the product of social struggles that belie any 
claim for objectivity.  For example, scholars have argued that 
international law is not a universal and objective system of rules.  
Rather, international law is created by groups of lawyers with different 
nationalities, education, and political interests who pull legal doctrine in 
different directions.55  Furthermore, some groups of lawyers pull 
 
(criticizing CLS scholars’ idealistic program to change the way lawyers think about the 
world, which they claim is imprisoned in an unjustified commitment to protect the 
status quo).  
 53 KARL POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 22–26 (2002).  
 54 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.  
 55 ANTHEA ROBERTS, IS INTERNATIONAL LAW INTERNATIONAL? 6 (2017).  
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stronger than others and bias international law in a direction preferable 
to them.  For historical reasons, international law is largely tilted toward 
Western states’ interests and legal choices.56 
The exposure of the sociological pressure that made international 
law what it is today has great scientific merit.  But it is an exercise in 
sociology, not in understanding legal doctrine.  When a scholar seeks to 
understand legal doctrine, she must build a theory that in the most 
parsimonious way describes the normative commitments of judges.  The 
historical reasons for the development of judicial behavior are 
irrelevant for this prediction.  Being aware of these historical reasons 
may help a scholar guess how law is going to evolve or explain the 
motives of individual judges, but it does not help to understand what 
judges view as their commitment to the law.57 
If a scholar makes a statement about the law, her statement has to 
be objective—not in the sense that it is necessarily true, but in the sense 
that it can be contested or checked on empirical grounds by any other 
legal scholar.  If a scholar were to say, “I am American, and therefore I 
need to correct for my biases by viewing international law differently 
than my initial inclination,” her observations about international law 
would not converse with the views of any other scholar.  Because the 
American scholar can never be trusted to fully debias herself and adopt 
an objective view, her statements about the law are useless for the 
scientific community.  Even if such statements are made with conviction, 
they are not scientific.  
In contrast, the claim that international law is Eurocentric is 
susceptible to empirical investigation and can in principle be checked 
by any other scholar.  Unless judges view it as normatively legitimate to 
openly serve Western interests, however, such a claim has to be 
investigated with nonlegal tools such as a sociological or historical 
inquiry.  Such a claim may point out the reasons that historically caused 
the law to become what it is, but it does not point to the purpose that 
the legal system today tries to fulfill.  It says nothing about the judges’ 
commitments or what they would view as legitimate legal arguments.58  
Therefore, such a claim is scientific, but not legal.  
 
 56 Id. at 9.  
 57 See Jakob v. H. Holtermann & Mikael Rask Madsen, European New Legal Realism 
and International Law: How to Make International Law Intelligible, 28 LEIDEN J. INT’L. L. 
211, 215–20 (2015) (explaining that while the legal scholar does not share the 
normative commitments of the judges, she offers a description of these normative 
commitments (“perceptions of axiological validity” to use the terminology of the 
paper)).  
 58 See id. 
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The only way to make a claim that is both legal and scientific is to 
use the structure that is advocated in this Article, namely make 
assumptions and test hypotheses based on them.  Take, for example, the 
claim that international law is committed to order more than it is 
committed to justice.59  To test that claim, it is possible to assume that 
international law is committed to order and check if hypotheses formed 
under this assumption lead to accurate predictions of international 
judgments.  If they do, one could argue that international law can be 
explained as if it is committed to order.  If they do not, the assumption 
of commitment to order must be discarded.  
For example, a scholar could assume that the legal doctrine on 
maritime delimitation is more committed to order than to justice and 
use it to construct a hypothesis on how the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) would decide disputes.  The hypothesis can either be refuted or 
confirmed based on the empirical investigation of ICJ judgments.  
Assuming commitment to order, the natural hypothesis is that the ICJ 
would draw maritime borders based on the equidistance line—which 
protects order and certainty.  In fact, ICJ judgments on the subject 
fluctuated between applying the equidistance line and taking equity 
concerns into account.60  Therefore, it is possible that an assumption 
that international law is committed to order would not lead to good 
hypotheses about ICJ practice in this specific area and would have to be 
replaced with an assumption of a commitment to justice.61 
Because scientific claims are open for contestation by any scholar, 
the common view accepted by the scientific community emerges as a 
shared paradigm.  Thomas Kuhn described the way paradigms in 
science change in his famous book The Structure of Scientific 
 
 59 See ANDERS HENRIKSEN, INTERNATIONAL LAW 17–18 (2nd ed., 2019).  
 60 See, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf (Fed. Republic of Ger./Den.; Fed. Republic of 
Ger./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 51–52 ¶ 89–91 (Feb. 20) (observing that according to the 
equidistance method, the Federal Republic of Germany would get a small continental 
shelf compared to the length of its coastline because of its concave shape.  The court 
decided that the parties should take into account also the proportionate length of 
coastlines when they negotiate a solution to avoid an unjust result.); see also Tanaka 
Yoshifumi, Reflections on the Concept of Proportionality in the Law of Maritime 
Delimitation,16 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 433, 434–43 (2001) (referring to more 
decisions by the ICJ and arbitral tribunals on division of continental shelves). 
 61 See Malcolm D. Evans, The Law and the Sea, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 676–80 (Malcom 
D. Evans eds., 4th ed., 2014) (following the equidistance line can lead countries with a 
concave coastline caught between two other states to get a very small continental shelf 
compared to the length of their coastline.  Considerations of equity can mitigate against 
that, but note that this is a very limited view on equity.  International courts do not 
consider economic factors and distributive justice when they determine maritime 
disputes.  Therefore, even if there have been digressions from the order dictated by the 
equidistance line, they did not go all the way to sustain an ideal of justice.).  
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Revolutions.62  His analysis is relevant also for changes in legal 
paradigms.  Legal scholars can use the paradigmatic view of the legal 
community as an assumption and build their hypotheses of what is the 
law on a specific issue based on that paradigmatic view.  When the 
assumption leads to inaccurate predictions vis-à-vis a specific doctrine, 
it can be discarded regarding the analysis of that doctrine and possibly 
kept regarding others.  If a critical mass of doctrines cannot be explained 
based on the assumptions shared by a certain paradigm, a paradigm 
shift can occur.  
For example, when Wolfgang Friedmann described international 
law as shifting from the “law of coexistence,” concerned with regulating 
conflicts between competing states, to the “law of cooperation,” 
concerned with sustaining collaboration and forming effective 
institutions, he was describing a classical paradigm shift.63  One could 
take the claim that the world today is described by the law of 
cooperation as an assumption and use it to build a hypothesis about the 
amount of deference, or margin of appreciation, the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECHR) shows to member states of the Council of Europe.  
Scholars have indeed argued that the margin of appreciation granted to 
states takes into account many elements of governance and not just the 
sovereignty of the states involved.64  The practice of the ECHR is 
therefore explained well under the assumption that international law is 
a law of cooperation.  
Not all paradigms have to be phrased at such a high level of 
generality.  One could, for example, argue that the law on belligerent 
occupation shifted from a focus on the rights of the sovereign state 
whose territory is occupied to a focus on the rights of protected persons 
 
 62 See generally THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962). 
 63 WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1966)  
 64 See Eyal Benvenisti, Margin of Appreciation, Consensus and Universal Standards, 
31 NYU J. INT’L L. POL. 843, 849 (1999) (arguing that the ECHR should show less 
deference in case states do not represent the people affected by their actions); ANDREW 
LEGG, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: DEFERENCE AND 
PROPORTIONALITY 27–31 (2012) (arguing that the ECHR does in fact show different levels 
of deference to states based on their ability to properly represent the relevant interests); 
Shai Dothan, The Three Traditional Approaches to Treaty Interpretation: A Current 
Application to the European Court of Human Rights, 42 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 765, 793 (2019) 
(arguing that the ECHR is justified in showing less deference to states when they fail to 
properly represent the people affected by their actions based on the assumption that 
the ultimate source of authority for international courts is individuals and not sovereign 
states); ARMIN VON BOGDANDY & INGO VENZKE, IN WHOSE NAME?: A PUBLIC LAW THEORY OF 
INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 210–13 (2014) (arguing that human beings are indeed the 
source of authority behind international courts); see also Anne Peters, Humanity as the 
A and Ω of Sovereignty, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 513, 514 (2009) (arguing that humanity is in fact 
the underlying reason to respect state sovereignty).   
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living under occupation.65  The assumption that the rights of protected 
persons matter more than issues of sovereignty can lead to hypotheses 
about concrete legal questions.  A possible hypothesis suggests that 
courts would allow the occupying power to use natural resources in the 
occupied area if it appears to serve the needs of the local population 
under occupation.  Despite the significant potential for abuse of such a 
doctrine by occupying powers, this hypothesis does have some support 
from judgments, suggesting that the novel paradigm is indeed a useful 
assumption.66 
The laws regulating the use of force (jus ad bellum) can serve as 
another example.  These laws can usually be explained well based on the 
assumption of proportionality: every armed attack can be answered 
only by using proportional force.  However, when a country is exposed 
to a series of armed attacks, the “pin-prick doctrine” allows it to respond 
with one major strike that is equivalent to the aggregated force of all the 
small attacks against it.  In some situations, therefore, international law 
doctrines can be better explained by an assumption that delayed and 
disproportionate retaliation is allowed.67 
As these examples demonstrate, the method of legal analysis 
advocated here has a key advantage over any scholar’s attempt to debias 
herself and provide what seems to her to be an objective view of the law.  
The advantage of this method is that any scholar, regardless of his or her 
individual biases, can engage in the same empirical investigation.  Any 
scholar can analyze the same legal materials based on assumptions 
shared by the legal community and use them to test hypotheses to 
 
 65 See Eyal Benvenisti, The Security Council and the Law on Occupation: Resolution 
1483 on Iraq in Historical Perspective, 1 IDF L. REV. 19, 28 (2003) (explaining that the 
Fourth Geneva Convention from 1949 changed the focus of the law of occupation from 
the rights of the ousted government—protected by the Hague Regulations of 1899 and 
1907—to the rights of the population under occupation).  
 66 See HCJ 2164/09 Yesh Din v. IDF Commander in the West Bank (2011) ¶¶ 8, 13 to 
the opinion of President Dorit Beinisch (The judgment rejected an application against 
the operation of Israeli-owned quarries in the occupied West Bank.  Though its 
reasoning is very controversial, the judgment focuses on the rights of the protected local 
population and not on sovereign claims to the territory to reach the conclusion that in 
light of the length of the occupation and the potential damage that closing the quarries 
would cause to the local economy, the application should be rejected.).  
 67 See Dothan, supra note 9 at 1090–91 (explaining that the rules on proportional 
countermeasures are often useful for securing cooperation, according to the findings of 
experimental game theory.  In situations of uncertainty about the actions of adversaries, 
however, delayed and disproportional reactions are actually better at leading to 
cooperation, according to game theorists.  Because both doctrines seem to match the 
recommendations of game theory in the circumstances in which they are adopted, the 
laws of war can be explained as if they strive to minimize conflicts and reach efficient 
results.  Efficiency is just an assumption made at a higher level of generality and not part 
of the nature of the law.).  
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explain the law on a certain issue.  When assumptions fail to lead to good 
hypotheses, they can be discarded and replaced by others. 
V.  THE ARGUMENT FOR LIBERTY  
The two preceding arguments for maintaining the use of 
assumptions in legal scholarships were arguments about scientific 
accuracy.  They have to do with maintaining a clear vision of the law that 
can avoid unjustified, irrational, or arbitrary legal choices.  But there is 
another argument for using assumptions that stems from the likely 
normative implications of doing away with them.  This Part is dedicated 
to explaining why assumptions are necessary to sustain any form of 
liberal thinking.  
A.  The Importance of Free Choice  
Before dealing with the issue of assumptions, the merit of free 
choice must be clarified.  In On Liberty, John Stuart Mill defines the 
strongest argument against public interference with people’s private 
behavior as the realization that this intervention is likely to cause more 
harm than good.68  State intervention is likely to be harmful because 
mechanisms for collective decision-making are imperfect, but also 
because people usually know better what is good for themselves.  
The argument that every adult always knows better than society 
what is good for her own well-being may be refuted on empirical 
grounds.  People are often irrational because they have limited cognitive 
abilities and limited willpower.  People are also not entirely self-seeking 
and may choose to sacrifice their own welfare for the benefit of others.69  
Liberalism does not need to be committed to the strong thesis that 
people make perfect choices.  In fact, it may even concede that given 
people’s imperfections and the fact that default choices are not neutral, 
the choices available to people should be deliberately engineered to 
guide them toward making better decisions.70  
Nevertheless, liberalism does need to sustain a commitment to the 
following weak thesis: there is some form of connection between how 
people behave and what is good for them.  If people are making 
predictable mistakes, the menu of choices offered to them can be 
changed to avoid these mistakes.  But if there is absolutely no 
 
 68 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 150–51 (1859). 
 69 See  Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to 
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1477–79 (1998). 
 70 See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, 
WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 4–8 (2008). 
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connection between the actions people take and their own well-being, 
there is no utilitarian reason to let them choose at all.  
There may be other moral reasons not to force people to change 
their behavior against their will.  But the utilitarian reason is a much 
stronger bulwark against tyrants’ claims of greater efficiency.  It is 
difficult to appreciate why it is so important to let people go about their 
own business without realizing that the utility of free choice multiplies 
itself infinitely when large groups of people are considered.  
Constructing an elaborate choice metric to help one individual make a 
decision instead of deciding for her may look wasteful.  But when 
millions of people have to make many daily decisions simultaneously, 
limiting governmental regulation helps reveal boundless information 
about what forms of behavior and which transactions are beneficial for 
every member of the group.  By choosing, people disclose their 
preferences.  Even when people are nudged in a certain direction, the 
act of choosing between options reveals information that sustains a 
healthy market.  
Adam Smith famously called this phenomenon “the invisible 
hand,”71 and Friedrich Hayek elaborated on the way countless 
decentralized decisions of self-seeking individuals outperform any 
regulator.  If people buy what they need when they need it, this leads to 
levels of efficiency that are impossible for any central planner.72  Hayek 
also warned that even established democracies can easily slide on the 
slippery slope that leads from well-intentioned governmental 
regulation to the enslavement of society by dictators.73  To prevent the 
deterioration of liberal society, a certain humility of lawyers is essential.  
B.  The Humility of Making Assumptions  
Making assumptions is an exercise in humility because it means 
being willing to concede that certain relevant facts are unknown.  If 
lawyers assume that people who sign a contract wish to be bound by its 
provisions, they are proceeding on an assumption that may be untrue.  
Some people may not be aware of the content of the document they are 
signing at all, for example.  But for the law, there is a certain predictable 
trajectory that goes from human actions to legal consequences.  This 
trajectory cannot be broken by a claim that other solutions would better 
serve people’s welfare.  
 
 71 See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, 
Book IV Chapter II Par. 9 (1776, ΜεταLibri 2007). 
 72 See F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AMER. ECON. REV. 519, 524 
(1945).  
 73 See generally F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944). 
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The advantage of making assumptions lies in the fact that the gaps 
in the government’s knowledge are filled in a predictable way.  The 
government does not need to know everything.  It makes no claim that 
the actions people take are the best for them, all things considered.  
Instead, it produces legal implications that usually concur with the 
possibility that people do what is good for themselves.  In some cases, 
the law produces legal implications that concur with the view that 
people diverge from what is good for them in predictable and coherent 
ways.  Either way, the choices people make are meaningful because they 
are a factor in the complex equation that determines the legal rule.   
Many of the examples mentioned in this Article, such as the 
assumption that the law strives for efficiency, may seem distant from 
the assumption that people do what suits them best.  Nevertheless, these 
are just cases in which the link between people’s actions and their legal 
implications is more complicated.  Indeed, the trajectory that goes from 
peoples’ actions to the ultimate legal result may be quite long.  One could 
claim, for example, that to interpret tort law as if it were efficient the 
rules on negligence should be set at a level that leads to optimal 
incentives, given a set of assumptions about the rationality of relevant 
actors.  This does not mean that people will always follow their rational 
incentives, but it does mean that there is no need to inquire into people’s 
actual preferences and to decide for people what serves their own 
interest.  In contrast, there is a need to observe what people do and 
apply a legal solution based on their actions.  
When the government does away with assumptions, it must try to 
find out what is going on in people’s minds, and it may determine that 
what goes on there is biased in ways that are not predictable.  If people 
are treated as if they suffer from false consciousness that eliminates the 
link between their actions and their personal advantage, that is the end 
of liberalism and the end of freedom.  Freedom cannot survive when the 
government claims to know better than individuals what is good for 
them and allows itself to ignore any connection between people’s 
actions and their true interests. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this Article is to demonstrate that making 
assumptions is a vital tool of legal scholarship.  Legal scholars, as 
opposed to judges, are not committed to following the normative 
strictures of the law.  They have a different task: to describe the 
normative commitments held by judges. 74  The only way to do that 
 
 74 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.  
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properly is by making assumptions, constructing hypotheses based on 
them, and then testing these hypotheses against facts.  
Proper legal scholarship can be conducted by scholars with a 
variety of methodological outlooks.  But it is Law and Economics that is 
most frequently criticized for making assumptions that are false or 
simplistic.  The critics do not lie: Law and Economics is really based on 
assumptions and is more forthcoming and honest about it than other 
methodologies.  And it is also true that many of the assumptions made 
by Law and Economics scholars are simply untrue.  Yet this Article 
argues that Law and Economics scholars who make these assumptions 
are doing exactly what they are supposed to do.  They are following the 
proper intellectual process that can lead to progress in legal scholarship. 
The reader may ask herself: what are the normative implications of 
this argument about how law should be understood?  The answer is that 
every statement legal scholars make about existing law should follow 
the method of making assumptions.  Other ways of reasoning fall prey 
to unhealthy essentialism that leads to arbitrary decisions, forfeit the 
ability to communicate their conclusions effectively with other scholars, 
and endanger the most basic liberal principles.  This means that 
statements about the law that strive to have justifiable normative 
implications have to be based on assumptions.  Every time a scholar 
interprets an ambiguous legal doctrine, she should do so through 
assumptions and hypotheses.  Instead of saying what should be the 
specific recommendations of legal scholarship, this Article explains the 
methodology that must be followed to describe the current state of the 
law, a prerequisite for making any viable normative recommendation.   
